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FEDERAL REGULATION OF FALSE ADVERTISING
"0 what a tangled web we weave
When first we practice to deceive."
SIR WALTER SCOTT, MarMiOtt
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
The American economy is centered around the market place. Thus, it
is dependent upon the adequacy with which the market performs its essen-
tial function—providing the stage for the dialogue of buyers and sellers,
the response to which will determine future economic schedules of production,
consumption, savings and investment. Logically, it is only with full infor-
mation regarding the qualities, amounts, and prices of the available products
that such dialogue may be conducted intelligently. In a primitive barter
system type of economy, where there is a face-to-face confrontation between
buyer and seller, the buyer can question the seller about the qualities of
the merchandise before deciding whether to buy it. But, as the economy
has expanded, the seller has become an invisible partner to the "dialogue."
The buyer is at a distinct disadvantage, for he is forced to rely on
the distant seller's advertising claims in formulating his decision to pur-
chase without an opportunity either to question the merits of the goods or
the validity of the claims. Thus, with the complexities of our contemporary
economic system, the danger of misleading information in advertising is
greater than ever before, for false advertising can and will undercut the
buyer's capability to judge his purchase. If today's "dialogue" is predicated
upon false or inadequate disclosure, the resultant waste of economic re-
sources will pervert the function of the market? Perfect performance of our
economic system thus depends on the opportunity for all buyers and sellers
to have equal access to the market with complete knowledge regarding its
offers and requirements?
With the parallel development of national markets and modern com-
munications technology, advertising has indeed become the major method
of feeding the necessary information to the buyer in the market place. Ad-
vertising may be said to include all representations made by sellers or their
agents to induce the purchase of a product or service—from disclosures
in the popular mass communications media to the presentation of the product
itself by way of trademarks and labelling? As such, advertising is a major
1 Barnes, "False Advertising," 23 Ohio St. L.J. 597, 598-99 (1962).
2 This analogy is, of course, vastly oversimplified. Although we speak of a national
market, this is in reality a series of market-places accommodating the various localities
and products which make up the American economy. Again, the word "dialogue" is
used here to connote more than the face-to-face bargaining confrontation of buyer and
seller in a store; we must also include the numerous situatimis where the buyer is con-
fronted by an invisible seller who bargains on the basis of advertising such as television
testimonials, packaging, and trade names. Obviously, complete knowledge is even more
important here, where a dialogue in the literal sense of the word is not possible. If these
expansions are noted, however, the model of a dialogue in a market-place is useful to
illustrate the basic role of advertising in our economy.
8 Barnes, supra note 1, at 597.
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creative force in business' Statistics reveal 11.5-12 billion dollars is spent
yearly on radio and television advertising; that direct mail advertising has
an annual cost of 1.5 billion dollars; that 1700 newspapers distribute a
total of 57.5 million copies daily; and that 270 farm and general magazines
reach 183.5 million people.°
If used to provide full disclosure of all relevant information, advertis-
ing can act as a catalyst in the development of ideal competition (in the
sense of greatest economic efficiency). But if abused—by outright lies,
half-truths, non-disclosure, false innuendo—the basic function of the market
will be perverted and the resulting economic response will no longer supply
the essential needs of society. This perversion may be thought of as occurring
at three levels .° First, the consumer will be deceived and will not get the
desired return. Second, with a premium on the advertising of one's wares
rather than on their efficient production, the ethical producer may be forced
to compete unethically in order to survive. Last, the operation of the market,
and, in turn, of the economy itself, will be undercut when false advertising
diverts demand to less utilitarian goods.
With the growth of advertising, there has been an increasing govern-
mental concern with these consequences of deceptive advertising practices
and a concomitant assumption of the responsibility of protecting not only
the individual consumer and the businessman but also of ensuring the mainte-
nance of free competition. Although recognizing both the businessman's
desire to make a profit° and the fact that by definition advertising involves
the lauding of the product in question, the law has imposed legal obligations
on the advertiser and has developed means to enforce violations of these
duties.
When confronted by the sheer magnitude of his choice and without
some assurance that this choice will not be influenced by false information,
the individual buyer would no longer be the most competent judge of what
to buy .° Contemporary market facts have thus resulted in the replacement.
of the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor° and its legal presumption of the
buyer's ability to look out for himself, with a governmental cognizance of
the necessity for regulation."
This comment will. consider the need, history, and status of current
statutory regulation of advertising; the manifestations of the various forms
4 Note, "The Regulation of Advertising," 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1018, 1019 (1956).
5 Moore, "Regulation of Deceptive Practices by the FTC," 16 Food Drug Cosm. L.J.
102, 111 (1961).
o Most commentators mention only two levels—see generally 56 Colum. L. Rev.
1018, supra note 4. But for the addition of the third, and perhaps the most basic dimension
of the problem, see Barnes, supra note 1.
I Experience has shown the necessity of restraining the stimulus of the profit motive
so that men will act "ethically" in the market-place. Moore, supra note 5, at 103.
o Barnes, supra note 1, at 602.
o For a comprehensive analysis of the history of the doctrine see Hamilton, "The
Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor," 40 Yale L.J. 1133 (1931).
19 As early as 1848, John Stuart Mill, the well-known exponent of the philosophy
of individualism, noted the need for state intervention when the consumer was no
longer a "competent judge of the commodity." Mill, Principles of Political Economy,
Bk. V, Ch. XI, 8 (1848).
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of false advertising and accompanying evolution of regulatory standards;
and the roles and procedures of the agencies which have assumed responsi-
bility in the area. Its scope will be confined to commercial, as opposed to
political and official advertising Likewise, given the nation-wide scope
of the market, federal regulation will be emphasized to the exclusion of con-
trol on the state level.
PRE-1914 SANCTIONS
Before the first federal regulatory statute was enacted in 1914, the
remedies available to the victim of deceptive advertising practices were
clearly inadequate; their efficacy was impaired not only by the plethora
of elements required before the courts were satisfied that a cause of action
had been stated but also by the difficulties inherent in proving them. The
injured purchaser could theoretically sue either in deceit or for breach of
warranty; the aggrieved producer could seek an injunction against his com-
petitor. A brief discussion will serve to point out the deficiencies of each
remedy.
The consumer plaintiff had to allege and , prove five elements to state a
cause of action in deceit:" a false representation of a fact by defendant;
defendant's knowledge or belief that the representation was false ("scienter");
defendant's intent to induce plaintiff to act or refrain from action in reliance
on the misrepresentation; plaintiff's reasonable reliance; and the damages
to plaintiff resulting from that reliance. General difficulties in proving these
elements are illustrated by a Massachusetts case, 12 where plaintiff purchased
a loaf of bread in which part of a nail was embedded. The bread had been
advertised as "100 per cent pure, made under the most modern, scientific
process." The court held that plaintiff had not proven the falsity of the
representation since it could be construed as advertising the absence of
unwholesome ingredients, rather than warranting against the presence of a
'foreign substance. In addition, plaintiff had not shown scienter, defendant's
knowledge of the nail.
Another general problem in an action for deceit arose in proof of the
injury sustained. This is so because damages are measured by the rule of
proximate causation—i.e., they are limited to those which might reasonably
be expected to follow from a plaintiff's reliance. The general rule is that nom-
inal damages are not awarded in deceit 13
The difficulties in a suit against the manufacturer for breach of warranty
were even more vexatious. First, plaintiff had to prove the existence of the
11 See generally Restatement, Torts, §§ 525-552 (1938); Prosser, Torts § 86 (1955
ed.).
12 Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N.E. 625 (1922). While it is
true that this case involves the negligence of the manufacturer in the production process
and, as such, would today be treated as a products liability problem, it is nevertheless
indicative of the practical hurdles facing the consumer who has relied upon advertising
that was, albeit unintentional, untrue.
13 Tsang v. Kan., 78 Cal. App. 2d 275, 177 P.2d 630 (1947); Brackett v. Perry, 201
Mass. 502, 87 N.E. 903 (1909) Cases allowing recovery in deceit are collected in 17
A.L.R. 672, 706. Accord: Prosser, supra note 11.
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warranty. Under the Uniform Sales Act," any affirmation of fact or any
promise relating to the goods which is contained in the advertisement which
induced the purchase will have the effect of an express warranty. If the
purchase was made under a written contract of sale, however, the parol
evidence rule might make proof of an oral warranty impossible.I 3
Two additional requirements to the showing of the warranty--those of
privity and reliance—further limited the use of this remedy. Traditionally,
the courts have held that the warranty runs only to the immediate buyer
and not to the ultimate consumer.'° Thus, there was no recovery against
the manufacturer without a showing of privity. 12 If the dealer had not re-
peated the representations of the advertiser, there was no cause of action
against him. 18 And a mere showing of the advertising copy to the buyer
was not considered a warranty of the truth of the statements in it." The
buyer had also to prove his reliance on the misrepresentations. 2° Lastly,
as in deceit, damages were again limited, here to the loss directly resulting
from the breach of warranty. 2 ' Such loss is often apt to be less than the
court costs of its recovery.
The problems involved in a suit by a competitor to enjoin a deceptive
advertising practice are illustrated by a leading federal case22 which was
predicated upon a defendant's deception of the public through the sale of
misbranded goods. The case denied recovery on the grounds that equity's
jurisdiction in a private suit for an injunction against unfair competition
was limited to the protection of the complainant's property rights. The court
held that a cause of action had not been stated, for complainant would
have no right of action unless defendant's deception of the public took the
form of an injury to complainant's property rights, i.e., the representation of
complainant's goods as defendant's own products. The court referred to the
thoroughly established principle that the private right of action
is not . . . based on fraud or imposition of the public but is main-
tained solely for the protection of the property rights of complain-
ant,23
14 Uniform Sales Act § 12 (1906).
15 Miami Cycle & Mfg. Co. v. Nat. Carbon Co., 268 Fed. 46 (6th Cir. 1920) ; Demos
Const. Co., Inc. v. Service Supply Corp., 153 Pa. Super. 623, 34 A.2d 828 (1943). See
Note, "The Parol Evidence Rule and Breach of Warranty Resulting from Misstatements
in Advertising," 29 Colum. L. Rev. 805 (1928) and cases collected therein.
16 Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928).
17 Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938); Prosser,
supra note 11, § 84.
18 Handler, "False and Misleading Advertising," 29 Yale L.J. 22, 26 (1929).
19 Cool V. Fighter, 239 Mich. 42, 214 N.W. 162 (1927).
29 Euzent v. Barrash, 180 Md. 451, 25 A.2d 462 (1942); Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., 376 III. 470, 34 N.E.2d 427 (1941); Harrington v. Smith, 138 Mass. 92 (1884).
21 Uniform Sales Act § 69(6) (1906). It is interesting to point out that even if the
facts would seem to warrant a suit for breach of contract, the general rule is that adver-
tising is not an offer ; it is merely an invitation for an offer, an "offer to offer" as it were.
Carlin v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q.B. 256 (1893). Thus, the advertiser may use
enticing terminology to attract the buyer and yet be free to negotiate with him on an
entirely different basis. 1 Williston, Contracts 27 (3d ed. 1957).
22 American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
23 The court went on to note:
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and concluded, "It is doubtless morally wrong and improper to impose upon
the public by the sale of spurious goods but this does not give rise to a pri-
vate right of action." 24
 While deploring the ethics of the situation, the court,
Cassandra-like, concluded that any change of remedy must be initiated by
the legislature.
In addition to the specific difficulties of each remedy, there were certain
further deficiencies common to all three. As we have seen, the individual
plaintiff had to allege and prove an injury resulting .from the deceptive prac-
tice, greater than nominal money damages or the infringement of his property
rights. Judicial inflexibility in delineating the elements of each cause of
action and the difficulty in proving these prerequisites, in addition to the
time and cost of litigation, barred from the courts many individuals with
valid claims.
HISTORY OF FEDERAL STATUTORY REGULATION
The first federal regulatory statute, the Federal Trade Commission Act
of 1914,25
 seemed designed to alleviate these and other ills. 2° Under the •
Act, which made illegal "unfair methods of competition in commerce," the
Commission was empowered to commence an action for violation of the
statute' if it had reason to believe that an unfair method of competition
was being or had been used, and if the Commission further felt that a pro-
ceeding brought by it would be in the public interest. Thus, the Act eliminated
both the problems of cumbersome causes of action and of proving sufficient
injury which had been so damaging to pre- 1914 suits. By entrusting control
of false advertising to an administrative agency, the Congress also demon-
strated its cognizance of the unique characteristics of such an institution
which made it more qualified than either a court or an individual litigant
to respond to the problems in the area. Most notably, the agency had the
There is a widespread suspicion that many articles sold as being manufactured of
wool are not entirely made of that material. Can it be that a dealer who should
make such articles only of pure wool could invoke the equitable jurisdiction of
the courts to suppress the trade and business of the persons whose goods may
deceive the public? We find no such authority in the books.
Id. at 286.
24 Accord, Weener v. Brayton, 152 Mass. 101, 103, 25 N.E. 46, 47 (1890), where the
court said:
The jurisdiction of equity to restrain the wrongful use of such trademarks by
persons not entitled thereto is founded not upon the imposition on the public
thus practised but on the wrongful invasion of the right of property in such
trademarks.
25 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. II 41-58 (1958).
26 There is much textual authority to the effect that a second, if not controlling,
purpose of the Act was to answer the public discontent with the present status of anti-
trust law—the sentiments aroused 'by the presidential campaigns of William Jennings
Bryan and the "trust-busting" of Theodore Roosevelt. In addition, the inadequacies of the
Sherman Act of 1890 became clear in 1911 after the Supreme Court's announcement of
the "rule of reason," i.e., that the statute did not prevent all combinations in restraint of
trade, merely those which were unreasonable. United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See Cushman,
The Independent Regulatory Commissions, 177-78 (1941).
27 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958).
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following powers: to initiate proceedings without awaiting a moving party;
to constantly administer a continuing problem with the required expertise;
to relieve the over-burdened and under-specialized courts and Congress from
responsibility in the area; and to assume the expense of representing the
general public against the alleged violator.28
In general, federal regulation of advertising has not developed as a
uniform scheme; rather, it reflects a piecemeal approach, a step-by-step
application of curbs to specific evils arising under the common law and
under the early statutes. Under its power to regulate commerce, 2° Congress
has passed two general laws and four special enactments (the so-called
truth-in-products statutes) conferring jurisdiction upon the Federal Trade
Commission. Even after considering the various grants of jurisdiction in
the area to other agencies, to be discussed below," one may conclude that
the FTC has the major federal responsibility in the advertising field."
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914" made no specific reference
to false advertising but, in section 5, limited the Commission's jurisdiction
to "unfair methods of competition in commerce."" By this phrase, Congress
intended to include false advertising;" indeed the first two tases decided
under the statute dealt with false advertising."
For the purposes of this paper, three relevant problems arose in the
construction of the seemingly straightforward phrase, "unfair methods of
competition in commerce." One of these was solved by judicial interpreta-
tion; one required further legislative enactment; and one necessitated a
resort to both methods of institutional settlement.
The first problem concerned the assessment of institutional responsibility
for determining the existence of "unfair competition." Although the Act
specifically provided that the FTC's findings of fact were to be binding on
the courts and that the scope of judicial review was to be limited to questions
of law," the early cases clouded this distinction and held that the court,
not the FTC, was the proper agency to define the term." Later cases, how-
28 There is a plethora of authority substantiating the advantages of regulation by
administrative agency. See Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee of Ad-
ministrative Procedure, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-20 (Comm. Print 1941); Davis, Admin-
istrative Law 10, 11 (1951); Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law 3 (4th ed. 1960);
Woll, Administrative Law: the Informal Process 5-7 (1963).
29 U.S, Const. art. I § 8.
29 See text at notes 152-77, infra,
81 As early as 1932, over 90% of all proceedings before the FTC involved advertising
abuses. Watkins, "An Appraisal of the Work of the Federal Trade Commission," 32
Colum. L. Rev. 272, 277 (1932). Note that this was before the scope of the Commission's
jurisdiction was enlarged by the Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938, infra note 42.
82 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
83 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958).
84 Barnes, supra note 1, at 605. There is some authority that Congress also in-
tended to regulate monopolistic practices under § 5; for this point of view see note 26
supra.
88 FTC v. Abbott & Co., 1 F.T.C. 16 (1916); FTC. v. Circle Cilk Co., 1 F.T.C.
13 (1916). Textile products containing no silk were advertised as "silk" and "cilk"
respectively.
86 38 Stat. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1958).
n FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920). But see Mr. Justice Brandeis, dis-
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ever, reversed this trend and recognized the Commission's exclusive power
to determine the unfairness of a specific practice."
The second problem arose when the first Raladam case, FTC v. Raladam
Co.," held that it was not enough to show that a practice was unfair without
proving the existence of a competition which was injured. In other words,
without a showing that substantial competition—as opposed to the public
generally—was injured or threatened to be injured by the unfair methods
complained of, the FTC had no jurisdiction.'" Thus, the Commission would
not be able to restrain the unfair practice of a monopoly or an industry
where all the competitors joined in the practice. The case was much criti-
cized on the grounds that Congressional intent had been not only to ensure
competition but also to protect the consumer. 4 '
To counteract the Raladam holding, Congress enacted the Wheeler-Lea
Amendments of 1938.42
 The Amendments added four new sections to the
original Act and amended section 5 43
 so that it now read, "unfair methods
of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce are declared unlawful."'° (Emphasis supplied.) By omitting the
word "competition" from the additional language, the emphasis was shifted
from practices unfair to competitors to those injuring the general public;
and by removing the proof requirement of injury to competition, the FTC
was able to protect the consumer directly 9 5
The solution of the third problem under the original enactment is attri-
butable to both an evolution in judicial interpretation and an additional
manifestation of legislative intent. This problem concerned the meaning of
the words "in commerce." (Emphasis supplied.) It was held that this juris-
dictional grant was less broad than that of "affecting commerce," as appeared
in such statutes as the Interstate Commerce Commission Act. Since, as the
Supreme Court held, the history and operation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Interstate Commerce Commission were different, there was
a different rationale for the scope of their jurisdiction.'" Thus, in FTC v.
senting in Gratz, at 437, to the effect that whether or not the practice was unfair was
to be determined by the Commission, subject to judicial reversal only on the grounds
of unreasonableness.
38 See FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
3° FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
4° Id. at 646.
41 56 Colum. L. Rev. supra note 4, at 1022; Note, "The Consumer and Fed-
eral Regulation of Advertising," 53 Harv. L. Rev. 828 (1940). Raladam was contra
to an early judicial suggestion that the function of the FTC was to protect the con-
sumer. FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
42 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52-58 (1958).
43 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1958).
44 Ibid.
45 Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1942); Scientific
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941); Pep Boys—Manny, Moe and
Jack, Inc., v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941). It was said that before these
Amendments, the FTC spent "more time and money . . . in proving competition and
injury to competitors than .. . [it] expended in the proof of the offense itself." Hear-
ings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., 5 (1937).
40 FTC V. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 353 (1941).
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Bunte Bros., Inc.,47 it was held that FTC authority did not extend to prac-
tices in intrastate commerce albeit their substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. The dissent in that case emphasized the discrepancy between such an
interpretation and the principle handed down in The Shreveport Case."
Although later judicial interpretations gradually expanded this restrictive
definition of commerce," successive legislation supplied a further impetus
to the trend. The Wheeler-Lea Amendments 5° conferred jurisdiction over
the "dissemination" in commerce of any advertisement of food, drugs, cos-
metics, and devices; 51 and the four truth-in-products statutes enacted be-
tween 1939 and 1960 52 further broadened the grant of commerce clause
jurisdiction." Current cases" have given a more liberal construction to
47 Early cases were in accord—see Canfield Oil Co. v. FTC, 274 Fed. 571 (6th
Cir. 1921), requiring an actual involvement in interstate commerce, i.e., more than a
mere close relationship between intrastate and interstate commerce. An exception was
allowed where the intrastate and interstate activities were so intermingled as to be in-
separable. General Motors v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1940); FTC v. Hoboken
Whitehead and Color Works, Inc., 67 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1933).
48 Houston and Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1913).
42 After United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) held
that an insurance contract was interstate commerce, it was held by analogy that a purchase
of advertising space in a publication published in another state and of national circula-
tion is interstate commerce. See, citing Southeastern Underwriters, Sunbeam Corp. v.
Wentling, 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950).
52 The Wheeler-Lea Amendments accomplished several other results besides those
cited in the text, although the general purpose was the same, namely, to enlarge the
jurisdiction of the FTC. These included a statutory definition of false advertising in
regard to certain types of products (food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices) and an ex-
pansion of the administrative enforcement procedures.
51 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
52 In order of their passage, these statutes are: Wool Products Labelling Act of
1939, 54 Stat. 1128 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68j (1958) ; Fur Products Labelling Act,
65 Stat. 175 (1951), 15 U.S.C. §§ 69-69j (1958); Flammable Fabrics Act, 67 Stat. 111
(1953), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1200 (1959); Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 72
Stat. 1717 (1960) as amended, 15 U.S.C. §* 70-70k (1963).
The rationale of these statutes is protection through requiring informative labelling
of certain categories of products. Certain practices in regard to these products, especially
their misbranding, both on the label and in the accompanying advertising material,
were made "unfair" within the meaning of § 5. The products were chosen because of
consumer inability to evaluate its qualities (fur and flammable fabrics) or consumer
confusion resulting from technological advances (synthetic textiles). The statutes are
similar to the previous regulatory scheme in that jurisdiction is still based on inter-
state commerce, but they are much broader in scope than the earlier enactments in that
they specifically regulate the products in question at all levels of production and distri-
bution. In addition, the FTC was authorized to promulgate rules and regulations detailing
the requirements for the labelling, invoicing, and advertising of each product. Regulatory
standards are thus easier to administer than under the broad concept of unfairness in
section 5. The same sanctions—i.e., the cease and desist order and the injunction—are
available.
53 The enactments purport to regulate not only conduct after these goods had
reached the market but also conduct at the stage of introduction into commerce; if
such conduct is "unfair" under § 5, the Commission may forbid their entry into the
channels of trade.
54 Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1959); Asheville Tobacco
Bd. of Trade, Inc., v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Shafe v. FTC, 256 F.2d
661 (6th Cir. 1958).
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the words "in commerce" consistent with the modern trend of federal consti-
tutional law in this general area."
Thus, both by statute and by judicial determination, the FTC has
become buttressed with broad jurisdictional grants of power. A more detailed
examination of the Commission's operating practices—the evolution of sub-
stantive regulatory standards and the availability of administrative proce-
dures and sanctions—should assist in evaluating , how well the FTC has
used this grant within the limits of its annual budget and of judicial review
of its actions."
THE COMMISSION AS IT EXISTS TODAY
Consideration up to this point has been directed at the birth and develop-
ment of the Commission. This gives a true perspective for the evaluation of
the Commission in its present state and an estimate of trends for the future.
This evaluation is divisible into three major categories:
(1) The methods of detection of false advertising, including careful
surveillance of the advertising field by the Commission to discover deceptive
practices on its own, as well as the reception and processing of complaints
from outside sources;
(2) The present standards against which the Commission measures
advertising in order to declare it either objectionable as deceptive or ob-
jectionable; and
(3) The procedures by which the Commission can and does take action
against deceptive practices.
METHODS OF DETECTION OF FALSE ADVERTISING
The first major step in the Commission's comprehensive program for
the elimination of false advertising is a surveillance of the entire field of
advertising that will be as extensive and yet detailed as time, money and
manpower will permit. The Federal Trade Commission Act has given broad
powers of investigation to the Commission," including subpoena powers,"
but obviously these powers are not self-activating. They reach only as far
55 An additional problem, more relevant to the control of monopolistic practices
than to the regulation of false advertising (see supra, notes 26 and 34) involved the
issue of whether the unfair methods of competition were to be limited to those which
were prohibited at common law or under the Sherman Act. Although the majority of
the cases had answered in the negative (see FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., supra
note 38, at 309; Sears, Roebuck Co. v. FTC, 258 Fed. 307 (7th Cir. 1919)), the question
was not fully settled until after the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments when
substantially all of the courts followed this trend, concluding that the purpose of the
Amendments was to enlarge the jurisdiction of the FTC to include the power to
regulate not only those trade practices which were illegal in 1914, but also those which
may arise in the future. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1947); Grand Union
Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). Note that again, final resolution of the prob-
lem was a result of action by both the judiciary and the legislature.
56 A large number of the Commission's orders are appealed to the courts since,
pending a final ruling, the advertising practice in question may be continued. See text
at notes 132-36 infra.
57 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. { 46 (1958).
58 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. { 49 (1958); 38 Stat. 724 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
{ 50 (1958).
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as available personnel can carry them. At present the Bureau of Deceptive
Practices consists of a Director, Assistant Director, assistant to the Director,
four Division Chiefs, and sixty attorneys. It also has a Division of Scientific
Opinion with a chief and seven professional employees. Comparing this man-
power limitation to the vast breadth of the advertising spectrum, the Commis-
sion is ultimately forced to allot its attention on a priority basis depending
upon the seriousness of the potential effect of a misrepresentation upon the
public. The advertising of certain products is more carefully scrutinized than
that of others. The list of priority products includes food, drugs, cosmetics,
health devices (particularly if potentially dangerous), wearing apparel, house-
hold goods, building materials, hygienic products (soap, dentifrice, toilet
preparations), correspondence courses, auto repair parts and accessories,
optical supplies and the like."
In 1962, FTC Chairman Earl W. Kintner announced an, intensified
examination of the communication media:
Instead of the present system of selective monitoring of TV com-
mercials, all national television networks are to be monitored
throughout the time they are on the air. Any advertising of doubt-
ful integrity will be investigated on a priority basis, with the scope
of the investigation to reach all those responsible for the deception o0
At present, all TV networks submit commercials disseminated during one
week in each month; television stations submit scripts covering a 24-hour
period four times a year. Radio stations submit continuities for a 24-hour
period every three, six or twelve months, dependent upon their size and
location. Twenty five newspapers, distributed geographically and represent-
ing metropolitan and rural areas, and ten magazines are surveyed every
week"' The problem is always present of allocating the services of approxi-
mately sixty attorneys engaged in investigation and trial work so that the
field will be most effectively covered.
Three types of specialization most commonly suggested are division
according to commodity, type of deception, and medium of advertising.
Specialization according to commodity seems highly impractical when one
considers dividing the thousands of commodities and services advertised
among the scant personnel available. This system would require every in-
vestigator to be familiar with every medium of advertising and every type
of deceptive practice in order to adequately police the full advertising cam-
paign of each commodity. Similarly division of manpower according to media
—magazines, television, radio, pamphlets—would require expert under-
standing of every type of misrepresentation as applied to every important
commodity. A strict adherence to the third possibility of creating experts
in each type of false advertising—from misleading prices to misstatements
about the quality, quantity, origin and manufacturer of the goods—would
lead to gross reduplication of effort. Every investigator would have to scan
BO Barnes, "False Advertising," 23 Ohio St. L.J. 597, 617 (1962).
eo F.T.C. News Summary, No. 59, Nov. 4, 1962, cited in 37 Notre Dame Law.
524, 528 (1962).
61 F.T.C. Ann. Rep. 1961, at 30.
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the same television or magazine advertisement for a violation in his particular
field. The system presently used seems to be a resultant of the three in
which the investigators by chance of experience have individually become
specially qualified in matters involving certain commodities 6 2 In the same
way experience has made some investigators more expert in the special prob-
lems of television or radio or newspaper advertising, etc. Because the decep-
tion of fictitious pricing is well adapted to any medium and nearly any com-
modity or service, practically all the investigators have to be competent in
this field.° In the more specialized areas of deception, such as misrepresent-
ing "guarantees" or television mock-ups, again some investigators become
experts through the chance of experience. While this "system" seems to
be the product of erratic evolution it does provide to some extent the benefit
of expertness that comes of specialization, without falling heir to the im-
possibilities and reduplication of effort that would accompany any suggested
method of strict specialization.
In addition to the efforts of the Commission itself, a major portion of
the job of surveillance is done by other officials and, more significantly, by
the general public. Incidents of false advertising come to the attention of
the Commission through complaints of deceived purchasers, competitors,
members of Congress, the Attorney General and other government agencies.
Complaints are investigated in every case possible on the priority basis re-
ferred to above. In 1962, 48.9 percent of the Commission's investigations in
the deceptive practice field arose directly from outside complaints 0 4 The com-
plainant's identity is not divulged" 5 and he is not made a party to any sub-
sequent proceeding.""
STANDARDS OF FALSE ADVERTISING
A. Introduction
The term false advertisement means an advertisement, other
than labeling, which is misleading in a material respect; and in
determining whether any advertisement is misleading, there shall be
taken into account (among other things) not only representations
made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, sound, or any
combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertisement
fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations or
material with respect to consequences which may result from the
use of the commodity to which the advertisement relates under the
circumstances prescribed in said advertisement, or under such condi-
tions as are customary or usual."
By means of Section 15(a) (I) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
62 Memorandum from Daniel J. Murphy, Director, Bureau of Deceptive Practices,
to Frank C. Hale, Program Review Officer, Nov. 1, 1962.
63 Ibid.
64 Auerbach, "Federal Trade Commission," 48 Minn. L. Rev. 383, 394 (Table IV)
(1964).
65 16 C.F.R. § 1.15.
06 16 C.F.R. § 1.14.
67 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 55 (1958).
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Congress has indicated the broad field but has left it to the Commission to
string the fence lines." Actually the distinction between allowable and
violative advertising has little of the clarity of a fence line, but rather com-
prises an area of discretion which can only be defined up to a point. While
the Commission must have standards, rules and yardsticks to guide its
actions, they must not , be so well-defined and inflexible as to bind the
Commission in a straight-jacket. As earlier suggested, the Commission must
be free to adapt its actions to meet the most ingenious, novel and subtle
shifts in the techniques of misrepresentation. Congress realized the im-
possibility of meeting the problem with the standard, slow-moving legisla-
tive-executive-judicial machinery, and placed the problem squarely in the
hands of this administrative agency, leaving it to their expertise to color
in the broad forms raised by such terms as "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices."" The field of false advertising is dynamic and constantly
changing as creative minds are applied to the problem of selling thirty-six
per-cent more dog food than the indistinguishable Brand X without breaking
any of the existing Commission standards. This is why the Commission is
not submerged in the cement of strictly interpreted, all-inclusive statutory
law, and it is also why an attempt at a precise definition of the line dividing
the allowable from the verboten would be obsolete before it was proof-read.
B. Who Is to Be Protected—Reasonable Man or "Fool"?
Conceptually, deception suggests an interaction of personalities. It
is but an abuse of the obvious to state that what may deceive a gullible
individual might not deceive one possessed of reasonable powers of observa-
tion and analysis In defining what acts are to be characterized as deceptive,
it is thus necessary to determine which cross-section of the community is to
be protected. In this respect there has been a steady progression from the
"reasonable man" standard in determining the capacity to deceive, to the
present standard of protecting the "fool."
In 1927, the Ostermoor Company advertised their mattresses by
pictures of a mattress with a tear in one corner from which the stuffing
flared out several feet. The court found that actually the stuffing would
extend no more than three to six inches. This, however, in 1927, was
dubbed the "time honored custom of at least merely slight [sic] puffing."
The standard the court applied in reaching its judgment was that "this
pictorial representation . . . even though exaggerated . . . cannot deceive
the average purchaser." (Emphasis supplied.) 70
Just ten years later the Supreme Court had before it an appeal from
a cease and desist order by the Standard Educational Society, an enterprising
encyclopedia concern whose representative told prospects that they (the
prospects) had been chosen from a small list of "well connected representa-
tive people" and would receive a full set of books FREE as an advertising
plan for just the privilege of using the name of the prospect—and $69.50
for a loose-leaf extension service. The entire performance was fraudulent.
68 Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F. 2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956).
69 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 3 45(a) (1958).
70 Ostermoor & Co. v. FTC, 16 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1927).
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Considering the scheme, the prospects were hardly chosen for their
brilliance of perceptiveness, and the $69.50 covered the price of the books as
well as the loose-leaf service. The appellate court had concluded that a man
buying a set of books would not be "fatuous enough to be misled" and
overruled the Commission?' The Supreme Court, however, reversed in
favor of the Commission and re-set the standards with the words, "There is
no duty resting on a citizen to suspect the honesty of those with whom
he transacts business. Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the
suspicious!"i2
Circuit Judge Augustus N. Hand nailed the next rung on the ladder
with language that has found its way consistently into the wording of court
opinions ever since. General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC)
devised a plan for installment purchasing of automobiles which it attractively
and elaborately advertised as the "6% Plan." The natural interpretation
of the unwary public was that the plan contemplated a simple interest charge
of six per-cent per annum on the unpaid purchase price. Actually the rate
of interest was six per-cent on the full amount financed until the account
was closed. This amounted to an actual interest rate of approximately eleven
and one-half per-cent per annum on the unpaid balance. Judge Hand upheld
the Commission and also clearly defined the present level of society at which
the Commission's protection is to be aimed:
It may be that there was no intention to mislead and that only
the careless or the incompetent could be mislead. But if the Com-
mission, having discretion to deal with these matters, thinks it best
to insist on .a. form of advertising dear enough so that in the words
of the prophet Isaiah, 'Wayfaring men, though fools, shall not
err therein,' it is not for the courts to revise their judgment."
Just prior to quoting these words of Judge Hand, Judge Lindley, in Aron-
berg v. FTC, aptly expressed the principle in these words:
The law is not made for experts but to protect the public,—that vast
multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but
too often are governed by appearances and general impressions?*
Judge Gardner reaffirmed this position since the advertising disseminated
by the company respondent reached people of "all classes and conditions." 75
C. What Practices Will Deceive the Fool?
Having decided to aim its protection at this level of public gullibility,
the Commission has levelled its attack on a great variety of deceptive
techniques. It would be impossible in this paper to discuss each technique in
detail, but for all their variety they do fall into specific categories. A detailed
77 Standard Educ. Soc. v. FTC, 97 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1938).
72 FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc., 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
78 General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940).
74 Arenberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942).
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examination of each category and the types of practice that fall within it
will give a basis for judging any practice not treated.
(I) Direct Misstatement About the Quality of the Product
The most direct approach is a clear misstatement, express or implied,
about the quality, character, capacity or performance of a product. For
example, the Commission found it a clear deception when Procter &
Gamble used the name "Naphtha Soap" to describe soap containing less
than one half of one per-cent of naphtha, a completely ineffective amount."
The same applies to calling a product "Duraleather" if in fact the product
contains no leather;" or use of the name of a fruit to designate an
artificially colored and flavored product without indicating its artificial
nature;" or calling products "preserves" or "pure preserves" which did not
reach the minimum standard formula used by manufacturers of "preserves"
or "pure preserves" (fruit content of 45 pounds to 55 pounds of sugar,
cooked to a consistency of approximately 68 per-cent water soluble solids)."
Use of the world "gold" is carefully scrutinized. When a product is described
unqualifiedly as "gold" it must be composed throughout of twenty-four karat
fineness within one-half karat tolerance." If the word is used to denote color
rather than composition this fact must be clearly expressed."
The progressive tightening of standards is evident in the degree of
relevance of the misrepresented quality which will draw the Commission's
official attention. In the 1927 Ostermoor case a direct misrepresentation
of the amount of stuffing in a mattress was not considered to give the
advertiser an unfair advantage. But compare the recent Colgate-Palmolive
television commercial in which the announcer said, "To prove Rapid
Shave's super-moisturizing powers we put it right from the can onto this
tough dry sandpaper."'" A close-up then showed a hand drawing a razor
through the lather and leaving a smooth path in the purported sandpaper.
"It was apply . . . soak . . . and off in a stroke." When the Commission
found that the sandpaper was a piece of plexiglass covered with sand on a
jelly like substance, a cease and desist order was issued. In defense, Colgate
claimed first that the cream would actually moisturize sandpaper to the point
at which it could be "shaved" clean; but it would require upwards of an
hour's soaking, and the limits of a sixty-second commercial compel the use
of a more practical method of demonstration. This defense was of no
avail, since the deception could easily have been cleared up by a word from
the announcer or a visual fade or dissolve to indicate passage of time. The
clear implication was that "rough sandpaper" could be so dramatically
moisturized in the time usually used to soak a beard before shaving.
A further contention of the respondent, and the one to be compared to
75 American Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 255 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1958).
76 Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 11 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1926).
77 FTC v. Masland Duraleather Co., 34 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1929).
78 FTC v. Good-Grape Co., 45 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1930).
79 Fresh Grown Preserve Co. v. FTC, supra note 45.
so 16 C.F.R. 4 23.32.
81 Ibid.
82 Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962).
717
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the Ostermoor case, is that the "sandpaper" demonstration was mere
metaphorical puffing. No one buys shaving cream to shave sandpaper, and
Rapid Shave did possess adequate moisturizing power to shave the human
beard. Here the court distinguished between harmless metaphorical references
to "sandpaper beards", or pictures of Frank Gifford of the New York Giants
behind a sandpaper mask just prior to shaving with Rapid Shave on camera
to illustrate the analogy, and clear direct misrepresentations of fact. The
sandpaper demonstration was not merely an eye-catcher. It was meant
to "prove" Rapid Shave's moisturizing power. It is immaterial that a
buyer does not intend to shave sandpaper, if his judgment in choosing a
brand can be affected by this misrepresentation. As Judge Manton put it in
the case of a retailer advertising himself as a wholesaler, "It is not necessary
that the product so misrepresented be inferior or harmful to the public;
it is sufficient that the sale of the product be other than as represented." 83
As the court further noted, "the customer is entitled to get what he is
led to believe he will get, whether he is right or wrong in thinking it makes
a difference."
A further distinction was drawn by the court in limiting the cease and
desist order to misrepresentations which pertain directly to a quality or
selling point of the product, as opposed to irrelevant misrepresentations that
do not affect the buyer's judgment of the product. For example, the television
camera distorts the true color of coffee, orange juice and iced tea; ice cream
and the head on a beer melt under the hot lights. Obviously the substitution
of a substance that gives the appearance of these articles on a television
screen is not a misleading representation. But here again there is a distinction
between showing a celebrity sipping what is actually heated red wine to
advertise coffee, and a close-up of that same red wine to the accompaniment
of a claim that the quality of the coffee is proven by its rich dark appearance.
Similarly, there is nothing injuriously deceptive in an announcer-model
wearing a blue shirt which photographs white • to show the fit and collar
style of the sponsor's new white shirts, but if he is advertising the strength
of a detergent by pointing to the whiteness of his shirt, it is another
matter.
The central, in fact the only issue before the Commission in passing
upon an advertisement is capacity to deceive. The fact that a representation
is literally true is no defense if the over-all impression is misleading. The
classic example of misuse of the "truth" occurred shortly after Reader's
Digest published an article on nicotine and tar content in cigarettes, con-
cluding that "the differences between brands are, practically speaking, small,
and no single brand is so superior to its competitors as to justify its selection
on the ground that it is less harmful." In fact, "the smoker need no longer
worry which cigarette can most effectively nail down his coffin. For one nail
is just about as good as another." From an accompanying table showing the
insignificance of the differences between brands, it was seen that Old Golds
contained less nicotine and tars than the others examined. Old Golds pro-
ceeded to "advertise this difference as though it had received a citation for
88 L & C Meyers Co. v. FTC, 97 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1938).
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public service instead of a castigation from the Reader's Digest." In affirming
a cease and desist order, the court referred to this use of technically true
statements as "a perversion which results in the use of the truth in such
a way as to cause the reader to believe the exact opposite of what was
intended by the writer of the article."84
In this regard it should be noted that the clarification of claims by the
use of small print will not be deemed to destroy the misleading effects
of easily read false representations. Misrepresentations about insurance
contained in easily readable form letters and application forms sent by
mail to prospective customers were not overcome by inclusion of miniature
policies, which of necessity were in small print and of considerable length."
Similarly, a subsequent clarification of a false representation does not defeat
a charge of misrepresentation. The publishing firm that made its initial
contact with authors by misrepresenting its policy on "royalty payments"
does not completely cleanse itself by later sending literature which clarifies
the initial misleading statement."
In these and other examples it is at least arguable that the Commission
is being excessively critical. If the buyer receives an article that will com-
pletely accomplish the purpose for which he bought it, how is he or anyone
harmed if the article cannot perform some outlandish and irrelevant feat
claimed by an over-enthusiastic advertiser? The answer lies in defining the
term, "relevant." If a false claim, no matter how divorced from the use to
which the buyer applies the product, plays a part in convincing him to buy
brand Y rather than brand X, that false claim is sufficiently relevant to
warrant a cease and desist order. At some point in the enforcement spectrum
we cease protecting primarily the interests of the buyer and begin protecting
the interests of competing sellers. The effects of a successful advertising
campaign has an obvious bearing on the success of one company and the
corresponding failure of another. On this basis, the Commission's standard
of relevancy is justified:
(2) Misstatements About the Status or Connections of the Manufacturer
or Seller.
A slightly different avenue of deception is misrepresentation of the
business status or connections of a manufacturer to lend the prestige of an
established name or governmental agency to the sales pitch. For example,
when a correspondence school called itself the Civil Service Training Bureau,
Inc., the Commission felt it was drawing a bit heavily on the status of the
Civil Service Commission with which it had no connection. The court
agreed.87 The Supreme Court upheld an order that companies which only
84 P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 57 (4th Cir. 1950). Accord: Bockenstette
v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1943). This decision might have heralded the effective
Cigarette Advertising Guide issued by the Commission on Sept. 22, 1955, which affected
the discontinuance of all claims regarding nicotine and tars, in view of the difficulty of
scientific proof either of the claims or of the implied significance of the claims as affect-
ing the health of smokers.
85 American Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 255 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1958).
86 Herzfeld v. FTC, 140 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1944).
87 FTC v. Civil Service Training Bureau, 79 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1935).
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blend flour for sale rather than do the actual grinding from wheat cease
referring to themselves as "mills," as for example "Royal Milling Company."
Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, said,
If consumers or dealers prefer to purchase a given article because
it was made by a particular manufacturer or class of manufacturers
they have a right to do so, and this right cannot be satisfied by
imposing upon them an exactly similar article, or one equally as
good, but having a different origin. Here the findings of the com-
mission, supported by the evidence, amply disclose that a large
number of buyers, comprising customers and dealers, believe that
the price or quality or both are affected to their advantage by the
fact that the article is prepared by the original grinder of the grain.
The result of respondents' acts is that such purchasers are deceived
into purchasing an article ... which they might or might not buy if
correctly informed of the origin. We are of the opinion that the
purchasing public is entitled to be protected against that species of
deception.. . 88
In 1929, the Commission put an end to the practice of a company that had
been the sole distributor of rugs made by the blind for the Chicago Lighthouse
when it began manufacturing and selling its own rugs under a corporate title
including the word "Lighthouse" and advertising itself as "sole distributors
of the Chicago Lighthouse." 89
Similarly, use of the word "wholesaler" is carefully restricted by the
Commission since the implication to the buying public is that the prices
charged are those available to retailers and therefore substantially less than
prices usually available to the consuming public." The use of the word
"laboratory" was prohibited when the respondents did not own, operate,
or control an appropriately equipped laboratory in which their products were
made or in which research connected with their products was conducted
by trained technicians." Use of the words "manufacturer," "manufacturing"
or "mfg." is prohibited unless the goods are actually manufactured by the
seller." Since the word "University" implies an educational institution
of higher learning having power to confer degrees and accredited by
educational and governmental authorities, use of the word was prohibited
where there were no entrance requirements or resident students, no library
or laboratory, and no faculty, and no educational or governmental author-
ization to give degrees or issue diplomas."
Similarly, the borrowing of the prestige of a brand name is verboten.
Manufacturers of automotive supplies such as spark plug cable sets were
forbidden to use the name "Champion" without the consent of the Champion
Spark Plug Company even if the latter did not manufacture the same
88 FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216-17 (1933).
89 Lighthouse Rug Co. v. FTC, 35 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1929).
99 L & C Meyers Co. v. FTC, supra note 83.
91 Albertz v. FTC, 118 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1941).
92 FTC v. James Kelley, 87 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1937).
93 Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
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articles." The same reasoning was applied in the case of a company which
used the name "Underwood" on its electric razors, "Remington" on its
cameras, and "Elgin" on other products."
There is a subtle shift of emphasis in the cases included in this
section. In the first section, the misrepresentation went directly to a
provable or disprovable quality in the product. In the latter section it goes
rather to a myth in the mind of the buyer, founded or unfounded, about
the product. Without considering the quality of the item itself, many buyers
will place immediate confidence in a product with the name "Remington"
or "Champion" stamped on it. The buyer is sold, not on a detailed inspection
of the item itself, but rather on trust in the brand name and the proven
experience, workmanship and reliability for which that name has stood.
Here again the Commission's strict standards are justified in the im-
portant dual protection they offer. Whatever may be his reasons for wanting
an article made by Remington, the fact remains that the buyer has a right
to receive an article as represented both in tangible and intangible qualities.
In the case of the Lighthouse Rug Co.," it is evident that the buyer intended
to give his business to a company of blind people. The quality of the rug
he purchased is immaterial to the misrepresentation. The same applies
to the perhaps unreasoned confidence in the solidity or responsibility of
a seller who is also the "manufacturer." In this age of science there can
be no doubt of the elevated image of a company that can include in its
name the word "laboratories." These arguments apply with greater force
to the more gullible, impressionable buyer. But this merely reaffirms the
opening position that the protection of the Commission will be aimed at
those most in need of it, the least sophisticated rather than the most. 97
Also vitally in need of protection in this area is the competing seller. The
economic value of exclusive use of a brand name is indisputable. Since
this type of false advertising is aimed primarily at elevating the dealer
in the mind of the public with the resultant esteem for his product, the
competing dealer is placed at a disadvantage that can outweigh his efforts
to produce a superior product. Strict regulation in this area is more than
justified.
(3) Misrepresentations About Third Parties, False Testimonials
Having considered deception involving the product itself, and secondly
the manufacturer or seller of the product, the third category involves
fraudulent use of the selling power of third parties, or false testimonials.
The Commission has attacked such flagrant abuses as failure to disclose
that manufacturers were paid to include a box of Tide or Dash in their
washing machines. The court sustained the Commission in ordering Bristol-
Myers to stop informing the listening public that "the 1940 National survey
recently conducted among thousands of dentists revealed the following
remarkable fact—twice as many dentists personally use Ipana Toothpaste
04 FTC v. Real Prod. Corp., 90 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1937).
95 Gaiter v. FTC, 186 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1951).
99 Lighthouse Rug Co. v. FTC, supra note 89.
97 American Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. FTC, supra note 75.
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as any other dentifrice preparation." Actually, of ten thousand questionnaires
sent out, approximately 2467 replies came back, of which 621 dentists
chose Ipana compared to 258, 189, 144, and 128 choosing the other four
leading brands—far from a conclusive basis for the extravagant advertising
that sprang from it."
In 1960, the Commission issued a cease and desist order against the
Niresk Industries, which sold an electric cooker, the cover of which had
received the Good Housekeeping Seal. The advertisements were worded in
such a way as to mislead the public into believing that the entire cooker had
been endorsed.
One area of critical public concern is the use of fraudulent endorsements
by alleged medical authorities. The Cigarette Advertising Guide issued in
September 1955 said, "No representation, claim, illustration, or combina-
tion thereof, should be made or used which directly or indirectly, . . . (4)
represents medical approval of cigarette smoking in general or the smoking
of any brand of cigarettes." This was the cue for the disappearance from
television commercials of the man in the medical white jacket surrounded
by medical journals thoroughly and confidently enjoying a particular brand
of cigarette, and has led to the present innocuous advertisements picturing
pretty girls and tattooed cowboys. One company has built its current
advertising campaign around this dramatic, but practically meaningless
phrase: "No medical evidence or scientific endorsement has proved any other
cigarette superior to Kent." In the same vein, a Commission order was
affirmed in the case of a medicinal preparation which is not endorsed by
any doctor but which included the letters "M.D." in the brand name. The
advertisements of the product which pictured a woman in a trained nurse's
uniform saying into a telephone, "Yes . . . M.D. is Decidedly Better," and
another of a young woman saying into a telephone, "Thank you . .. for
your advice, Doctor," were also considered gross violations."
This form of deception works to the disadvantage of three groups. The
buyer is affected in much the same way as discussed in the section above
on misrepresentations regarding the identity of the manufacturer or seller.
While the quality of the article may be equal to claims made about it, the
confidence which a buyer places in the person to whom the false endorsement '
is attributed is misplaced. This can become extremely dangerous when
medical opinion is involved. It is an unfortunately well-known occurrence
for a buyer to place his confidence in a product falsely endorsed by supposed
medical authority and to delay seeking medical advice until a major disease
or disorder has reached serious or irreparable stages. Here again the trustful
buyer is in serious need of protection. In other cases involving products from
which the buyer suffers little or no damage, there are still two other
interests to be protected. The unfairness to competing dealers is obvious
and the discussions in the previous two sections are equally applicable here.
The third interest is of course the alleged third party endorser whose
testimony may be twisted or falsely attributed. The name of Good House-
keeping, whose value depends on public confidence in its reliability, must
98 Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
99 Stanley Laboratories v. FTC, 138 F.2d 388, 391 (9th Cir. 1943).
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have the exclusive right to place its seal only on products it has in fact
approved or it becomes worthless. This same applies to any person or
company whose reputation is fradulently placed behind a product. It
does not apply to situations in which the endorser gives permission to falsify
his opinions. Thus, barring damage to the other two interests, the field of
"paid testimonials" has been left relatively untouched.
(4) Misrepresentation of Prices
This area of prices has characteristics sufficiently distinct from the
other categories to warrant a section of its own. In fact, there has been more
fraudulent activity centered around pricing than any other area. It is
perhaps the most fertile area for fraud because it appeals directly to the
one desire common to nearly all buyers—the desire for a bargain.
Some words have proven consistent sore spots because of their limit-
less capacity to deceive in the proper context. The English language could
supply the inventive mind of the deceiver with a no more deliciously baited
hook than the word "free." The theme described above in the Standard
Educational Society case'°° of offering an attractive article free with some
other purchase, when the price of the second actually covers the first, has
been played with infinite and profitable variations. The Commission has
issued extensive rules and guides in this area, including a rule against offer-
ing any article free if another article must be purchased as a condition
precedent and the price of the second article is increased."' Needless to say,
as the object of the Commission's protection went from "reasonable man"
to "fool" the quantity of decision law surrounding the word "free" ex-
panded geometrically.
Generally, violations take the form of a direct false statement that a
certain price is "below cost,"" 2 "special," "reduced," "introductory" or
"sale" price when the price charged is actually the usual price 1 03 The most
common misrepresentation is that regular prices are higher than they actually
are. For example, a carpet salesman could not refer to "usual" or "regular"
prices in his advertising when he had actually never sold this merchandise
before. This was held to be misleading although the "regular" prices quoted
were those at which other retailers in the market area were selling. 104 The
Commission also held it a violative practice when a watch manufacturer at-
tached price tags to his watches substantially in excess of the usual retail
price so that the buyer would think he was getting a large saving when
buying from the retailer.'"
In this, more than any other area, the Commission fulfills its purpose
by concentrating its attention and applying strict standards. Prices in this
100 FTC v. Standard Educ, Soc., supra note 72.
101 FTC Standard Trade Practice Conference Rule, Dec. 3, 1953.
"2 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, supra note 55.
"3 William H. Wise Co. v. Sit, 246 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Consumer Sales
Corp. v. FTC, 198 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1952),; Thomas v. FTC, 116 F.2d 347 (10th Cir.
. 1940); FTC v. Standard Ethic. Soc., supra note 72.
104 Bankers Securities Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961).
"3 Clinton Watch Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1961).
723
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
country are not worked out between the individual buyer and seller to
represent the value of the product to each. Rather they are set by the seller
when he places a price tag on the goods. The price generally represents
what the traffic will bear. If by the use of fraudulent techniques the traffic
can be made to bear a little more, the difference between the price and value
grows, and the stability of the economy ultimately suffers.
On a more personal basis, a buyer can frequently be induced to purchase
an article that he does not need or can not afford if he can be convinced
that he is getting a bargain. Here particularly, the gullible, less perceptive
buyer needs extensive protection, because in most cases he is not only
most susceptible to this kind of practice but also least able to afford it.
Here the wisdom of aiming the Commission's protection at the fool rather
than merely the reasonable man becomes most obvious. Also, since this
form of deception takes the greatest effect on the buying public, the cor-
responding prejudice to competing merchants is at its highest point.
(5) Miscellaneous Areas of Deception
While the four categories set out in the sections above encompass most
of the cases of false advertising, the Commission has shown a unique mobil-
ity in attacking deceptions that fit no defined category. The need for this
kind of mobility in dealing with the creative minds of the advertising in-
dustry is perhaps manifest in the following examples.
Bait advertising is the practice of makinj an insincere offer to sell a
well-known product at a large reduction in order to get a prospective cus-
tomer into the store. Once the customer is inside, the salesman can refuse to
show the advertised product, disparage the product, fail to have it avail-
able for sale in reasonable quantity, or refuse delivery within a reasonable
time, all for the purpose of switching the customer to the item the salesman
actually intends to sell.'" This technique of deception differs from each
of those discussed above in that no misrepresentation is made in any way
relating to the article actually sold. The deceiving merchant has however,
gained the advantage of having the prospective customer in his display
room, having come there with an original purpose of buying. The practice
has proven profitable to those who have tried it, and the Commission has
been of the view that a profit gained by this kind of deception should not
be allowed to continue. The protection again covers both the deceived pub-
lic and competing merchants.
There can be no question of the unfairness to both the buying public
and competition in the practice of false disparagement of a competitor's
product. A blatant example was the promotion of stainless steel cooking
utensils by claiming that consumption of food prepared on aluminum utensils
would cause cancer, stomach trouble and anemia."'
In dealing with an industry which depends on imaginative and creative
minds, the Commission must have an awareness and mobility that will allow
106 Pati-Port, Inc. v. FTC, 313 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1963); Better Living, Inc. v. .
FTC, 259 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1958).
107 Steelco Stainless Steel v. FTC, 187 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1951).
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it to move in any direction that the public interest in advertising may lead.
For example, in a recent case,'" The Haven Company offered the buyer a
selection of twelve articles which he could select from a list and buy at speci-
fied prices. As an eye-catching alternative the buyer could pull out one of
twelve tabs attached to the display. By then looking at the back of the tab
he could see which of the twelve items he had drawn. At this point the buyer
was free to buy that article or not as he wished. If he preferred he could
pull out another tab. He was also still free to select any of the twelve articles
from the list. The price to be paid was exactly the same regardless of which
method of selection he used. In other words the tab device placed him under
no obligation and gave him no advantage. It was completely pointless except
that this mock gambling aspect proved an attractive inducement to buyers
who would not otherwise be interested in the articles sold. The Commission
felt that although no misrepresentation was made either about the products
or the tab procedure, the appeal of the device was intentionally aimed at the
"take a chance" gambling instincts of the public. Since this contravened
what the Commission felt was a sound public policy against inciting and playing
upon the desire of the public to gamble, it was an unfair method of compe-
tition. The court sustained the Commission, which would seem to give the
Commission a free hand in effectively closing this avenue to the public Pocket
in the future.
FORMAL PROCEEDINGS IN DEALING WITH DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
The Commission faces the assignment of eradicating deceptive practices
from the broad field of advertising with an unfortunately underpowered
assortment of artillery. Consider the position and purpose of the Commission.
It attempts to fill the need for an experienced, qualified referee on the spot
in the midst of the action to call the "fouls" as it sees• them through the
eyes of an expert. To be effective in policing the dynamic and creative field
of advertising, the Commission needs a freedom of discretion that will allow
it to move immediately into any newly devised area of deceptive and unfair
advertising practices. In addition to this freedom, the Commission must
have the power and procedures to effectively stop deceptive piactices where
it finds them, and when it finds them. Against this one need, consider the
procedural weapons the legislature has placed in the hands of the Commission.
When the Commission learns through investigations or complaints that
a party may be practicing deceptive advertising, it has two avenues of
approach. In cases not involving an inherent danger to the public (such as
highly flammable fabrics or dangerous drugs) the Commission may notify
the party of its intent to issue a formal complaint. The party is then
allowed ten days in which to notify the Commission that he is willing to enter
into an agreement containing a cease and desist order. If the party agrees,
and if the agreement is submitted to the Commission within thirty days after,
the files are referred to the Office of Consent Orders,"° the consent order is
108 Gerson v. FTC, 325 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1963).
109 16 C.F.R. 4 3 (Stipp. 1963).
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entered and the cease and desist order takes effect immediately. By the
agreement, the party has waived any further procedural steps on appeal.
The consent order has a primary advantage of leading directly to an
enforceable cease and desist order without the inevitable delay of a formal
proceeding followed by exhaustive appeals, during which time the respondent
is free to continue his deceptive practice. Since the consent order procedure
was revised in 1963, the new procedure has been invoked to attempt a
consent settlement in every case but one in which the Commission has de-
termined to issue a complaint. 110
Whether the party will accept the consent agreement depends on many
factors including willingness to comply with the Commission's standards,
chance of success in litigation and desire to continue the deceptive practice
as long as possible. Under the revised procedure,'" once the formal com-
plaint issues, the consent order is no longer available. With the Commission
ready and willing to prosecute at the end of the ten day period, a party
knowingly in the wrong is now more likely to avoid the expense and un-
favorable publicity of formal proceedings while the chance is available.
Before the rule was adopted that "all hearings will be held at one place and
will continue without suspension until concluded ,M12 the Commission could
delay the major part of its investigations until well after the complaint had
issued and even after the hearing had opened. As a delaying tactic, the
respondent could commence negotiations for a consent settlement and effec-
tively stop further investigation until the negotiations collapsed. This
allowed him more "free time," as it were, to practice his deception until a
final cease and desist order could be entered. Under the new rule the Com-
mission is forced to complete its investigation and preparation before hearing
time, and the respondent can no longer interrupt the hearing by a delaying
offer of consent. If the party fails to accept a consent settlement within
ten days, a formal complaint will issue stating the charges and giving notice
of a hearing at which the party may show cause why a cease and desist order
should not issue. Any person, for good cause shown, may intervene.' 13
The central issue at this hearing is the capacity of the questioned state-
ment or picture to deceive;" 4 the burden of sustaining the complaint is
upon the counsel prosecuting the case. The proof problem in this area is
rather unique, in that the central issue is not susceptible of factual evi-
dentiary demonstration in most cases. Short of requiring a representative
poll in each case to see if people actually are deceived, the question can most
practically be decided as it is, by a Commission, deemed to have both
expertness and experience in dealing with false advertising, drawing on its
experience to determine the natural and probable result of the questioned
advertising technique. It is essential to note that the basis of a cease and
110 Murphy Memorandum, supra note 62
In 16 C.F.R. § 3, supra note 109.
112 16 C.F.R. § 4.14 (d) (Supp. 1963).
113 Gimbel Bros. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941).
114 Herzfeld v. FTC, supra note 86; Charles of the Ritz v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676
(2d Cir. 1944); General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1940); FTC v.
Hires Turner Glass Co., 181 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1935).
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desist order is the capacity to deceive and it is unnecessary to prove either
actual deception or any intent to deceive?" When the Commission found
that a hair coloring product given the name of "D'Oreal Henna" was giving
unfair competition to a previously established product called "L'Oreal
Henne," it ordered the manufacturer to cease and desist from use of the
proper name; the court in affirming said, "A deliberate effort to deceive is
not a necessary element in unfair competition . . . . Nor is it necessary
to support the order below, to find actual deception, or that any competitor
of the respondent has been damaged."1 " It is in fact not even necessary
that the seller know that his representation is false." 7 When Gimbel Bros.
conducted a sale on 7150 yards of mill end fabrics and advertised them as
"woolens" the question of knowledge on the part of Gimbel Bros. that a
large part of the material was ha mixture of wool and other fabrics was im-
material, since to the purchasing public the term "woolens" connotes a fabric
composed wholly of wool.'" As stated by the court, "the purpose of the
statute119 is protection of the public, not punishment of the wrongdoer."12°
Congress has given the Commission broad discretion as to what evidence
it will hear, allowing introduction of any "relevant, material, and reliable
evidence." 121 Here again the Commission is recognized as being peculiarly
qualified in its field, being given freedom from most of the technical rules
for exclusion of evidence which are applicable in jury trials. 122
In considering what impression an advertisement will make on the
public, the Commission considers the implications of the advertisement taken
as a whole rather than carefully dissected into individually, technically
truthful statements. Circuit Judge Learffed Hand described a decision of
the Commission as
the resultant of those unexpressed determinants which collectively
we conceal under the term, "discretion." We do not forget that from
time immemorial this duty has been entrusted to courts. But that
is irrelevant. Congress having now created an organ endued with
the skill which comes of long experience and penetrating study,
its conclusions inevitably supersede those of courts, which are
not similarly endowed. 123
Thus, when the E. F. Drew Co., selling and distributing oleomargarine under
the name "Farm Queen," described its product in circulars and other ad-
115 FTC v. Hires Turner Glass Co., supra note 114.
118 FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615, 621 (2d Cir. 1928). Accord: Bockenstette v. FTC,
supra note 84; Pep Boys—Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir.
1941) ; Brown Fence & Wire Co. v. FTC, 64 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1933).
117 See text at notes 12-13 supra.
118 Gimbel Bros. v. FTC, supra note 113.
118 The court here was referring to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat.
717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-48 (1958).
128 Gimbel Bros. v. FTC, supra note 113. Accord: FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19,
27 (1929); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 Fed. 744, 752 (2d Cir, 1922).
121 16 C.F.R. 	 3.14.
122 Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1953).
123 Herzfeld v. FTC, supra note 86, at 209.
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vertisements as "churned to delicate sweet creamy goodness," "country
fresh," and "the same day to day freshness which characterizes our other
dairy products," the Commission decided that these statements had the
capacity to mislead purchasers into believing that the oleomargarine was
a dairy product. The Second Circuit Court affirmed, holding that "the
Commission is not required to sample public opinion to determine what
meaning is conveyed to the public by particular advertisements." 124
Not only is the Commission not required to take its own polls, but it
is under no obligation to give public polls controlling weight over its own
determinations. The Rhodes Pharmacal Company built an elaborate adver-
tising campaign around IMDRIN—"Amazing new discovery for Rheuma-
tism, Arthritis." The Commission found that statements such as "Resume
Confident Pain-Free Living With Amazing New Imdrin" and "Imdrin .. .
the brand new safe and reliable way to cure pain that's being prescribed by
many doctors to bring quick, pleasant relief from Arthritis pains, stiffness,
and swelling" could be interpreted by the public to imply a cure for arthritis
and other related ailments. The respondent offered in evidence a poll of
300 people in New York City showing that 91 per-cent of those interviewed
interpreted the advertisement as implying merely relief from pain as opposed
to a cure, but failed to persuade the Commission. The Commission was upheld
on appea1.125
The Commission has frequently allowed the testimony of witnesses drawn
from the general public as to the impressions they had received from reading
certain advertisements,n 6 but such public poll testimony is not controlling
over a different conclusion by the Commission. In 1962 Commissioner Mac-
Intyre assessed the weight of public poll evidence in this type of decision
making. When Gimbel's advertised luggage which it sold at prices from
$6.98 to $15.98 as usually priced from $9.98 to $24.98, although Gimbel's
had not previously sold the luggage at higher than the sale price, the Com-
mission issued a cease and desist order. In the opinion, Commissioner Mac-
Intyre stated:
There can be no doubt that among the many millions in the
New York City area, ten, twenty, or even fifty witnesses could
be produced to testify that they understand that the term "list
price" means the price generally charged by retailers in their area.
And, doubtless, respondent could produce an equal number to testify
to a different understanding of the term. A record containing such
conflicting testimony would, at substantial expense, prove only
what is already obvious from a reading of the advertisment itself,
that is, that some people are likely to be misled thereby.' 27
Recently the Commission has adopted the evidentiary tool of official
124 E. F. Drew Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956).
122 Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, supra note 122.
126 Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1945); Stanley Laboratories
Inc. v. FTC, supra note 99, at 391.
127 Gimbel Bros., Inc., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations ¶ 16020
(1962).
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notice to expedite proceedings. In the Manco Watch Strap Co. case, 128 the
Commission ordered respondents (a) to cease and desist from , distributing
imported merchandise packaged in such a way as to conceal from prospective
purchasers the name of the country or place of origin of the merchandise
(Japan or Hong Kong) and (b) to disclose such information clearly in a
conspicuous place on the package or container. Commissioner Elman an-
nounced in his opinion that the Commission would adopt the following policy
concerning the requirements of proof in cases of this type arising in the
future:
In view of the frequency and consistency with which proof [that
a substantial number of buyers prefer American goods and believe
they are getting American goods unless informed to the contrary]
has been [offered] in countless prior proceedings, the Commission
may take official notice of that fact, and dispense with the need to
reprove it in each new proceeding that is brought."9
The Commissioner suggested that the hearing examiner set forth the officially
noticed general presumption of fact when relied on and give the respondent
the chance to rebut it by showing the contrary in the particular circum-
stances. It seems likely that official notice will come into extensive use to
prevent the repeated deciding of many such recurring instances of deception.
Once established, such a procedure may stimulate the party, uncertain of
his chances in litigation, to accept a consent settlement.
Appeal from a formal decision and order of the Commission may be
had as of right to the appropriate federal Circuit Court of Appeals, 18° and
once the record is filed on appeal, the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction
to affirm, enforce, modify or set aside the order of the Commission..' 8l The
further right to petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court is the final step
available to the respondent.
Until all appeals taken are concluded, the cease and desist order does
not become final, and the respondent can continue his questionable and
probably lucrative advertising techniques. This explains why most orders
that are contested are appealed to the hilt—or at least until the cost of
appeal exceeds the profit from the advertising. The classic case in this
regard is Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC?" The Commission found that
Carter's Little Liver Pills did not stimulate the liver, aid the flow of bile or
have a therapeutic value in the treatment of any condition or disorder of
the liver, and thus sought to prevent Carter from making false advertising
claims in this regard and to direct excision of the word "liver" from the
trade name. The Commission's original order was set aside on the ground
of unjustifiable restriction of cross-examination of a witness.'" On certiorari,
128 Manco Watch Strap; Co., 1961-1963 FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations
if 15781 (1962) at 20595; cited in Auerbach, "Federal Trade Commission," 48 Minn.
L. Rev. 383, 460 (1964).
129 Ibid.
139 38 Stat. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. / 45(c) (1958).
131 38 Stat. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 45(d) (1958).
182 Carter Prods. Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1959).
188 Ibid.
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the Supreme Court ordered a re-opening of the case, 134 and a new order
was finally affirmed in 1959.' 36 Over sixteen years of litigation finally ended
with a denial of certiorari in November of 1959. 136
The role played by the appellate courts in creating the standards for
allowable advertising has been progressively diminished as the courts have
become more aware of the implications intended by Congress in enacting the
mandate, "The findings of the Commission as to facts, if supported by evi-
dence, shall be final."'" The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce
stated that the Commission was created with the avowed purpose of lodging
the administrative functions committed to it in "a body specially competent
to deal with them by reason of information, experience and careful study
of the business and economic conditions of the industry affected."'" It
was organized in such a manner, with respect to the length and expiration
of terms of office of its members, as would "give to them an opportunity to
acquire the expertness in dealing with these special questions concerning
industry that comes from experience."'" On appeal, the court merely seeks
to establish that the Commission's determinations are supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record as a whole. The court may not substitute
its own findings for those of the Commission.'" Because of an authority of
expertness in its field, the appellate courts give great respect to determina-
tions of the Commission 141 and will not reverse them unless they are clearly
unreasonable. 142
 In effect, the courts have followed the spirit of the intent
of Congress to give the Commission the relatively free hand of discretion.
Although Section 5(c) of the Act makes the Commission's findings of
fact conclusive (if supported by evidence), the appellate court has the
power to modify the Commission's order as well as affirm or reverse 11.143
This review is, however, similarly limited by judicial concession to the
authority of expertness of the Commission. A leading case on this point
involved a fur dealer who labeled certain coats "Alpacuna."'" It was
determined that the label was misleading because of the absence of any
vicuna in the make-up of the material. The appellate court found that
the Commision's order banning the use of the word "Alpicuna" was un-
necessarily harsh in view of the considerable business value of a well known
trade name. The court wished to amend the order to permit use of the label
with some qualifying explanation, but reluctantly affirmed the Commission's
order since "the choice of remedy is a matter confided primarily to the expert
134 Carter Prods:, Inc. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 327 (1953).
135 Carter Prods,, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 132.
136 Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 361 US. 884 (1959).
137 38 Stat. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1958). See text at notes 35-38 supra.
138 Report of Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, No. 597, June 13, 1914,
63rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 9, 11; cited in FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304
(1934).
130 Ibid.
140 FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc., 302 U.S. 112, 117 ( 193 7).
141 FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n 273 U.S. 52, 61 (1927).
142 E. F. Drew Co. v. FTC, supra note 124.
143 38 Stat. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1958).
144 Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1944).
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judgment of the Commission, [and] the courts are quite properly loath to
set up their own judgment in opposition to that of the administrative tri-
bunal." 145
 On certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed that "[the Commission]
has wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere except
where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful prac-
tices found to exist. ,;146
When the Colgate Company used a deceptive demonstration to "prove"
the moisturizing power of Rapid Shave in a television commercial, 147 the
Commission's order prohibited use of demonstrations or pictures in television
commercials which misled the television viewer as to what he was seeing.
The order appeared harmless, until the court pointed out the distinction
between such practices as the use of a yellowish substance on camera to
exaggerate the richness of a particular brand of milk, and that of using
colored water which gives the exact appearance of iced tea on a television
screen to compensate for the fact that the camera distorts the color of actual
iced tea. In the latter case the viewer is not led to believe any false claim
about the product, while in the former he is. The court reversed the order
as originally entered and remanded the case for drafting of an order in com-
pliance with this distinction. Here the Commission's order had clearly
exceeded the bounds of the problem and would have worked a great and
needless hardship on all television advertising. Theoretically under the orig-
inal order, painted backdrops would have to go as misrepresentations, and con-
ceivably the girl next door would have to cease to be an eye-catching starlet.
In key industries which rely heavily on advertising, such as the cig-
arette industry, the Commision convenes periodic Trade Practice Conferences
in which all members of the industry are invited to participate. The results
of these conferences are the publication of Trade Practice Conference Rules
for advertising practices. Future violations of these rules are dealt with
by the Commission by the usual cease and desist procedures, although a
formal complaint would charge violation of the statute on which the rules
are premised rather than violation of the rules themselves."'
The issuance of Advertising Guides by the Commission for various key
industries has proven a successful means of providing guidance to the mem-
bers of the industry who want to comply with legal standards, and also of
giving notice to the industry of the standards currently being employed by
the Commission in evaluating advertising claims'" The Cigarette Adver-
tising Guides are credited with eliminating some sixty-two questionable claims
146 Id., at 756.
140 Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946). The case was remanded
because it appeared that the Commission had not considered the more limited order.
On remand, the Commission modified its order as suggested. 43 F.T.C. 256 (1946).
141 Colgate-Palmolive V. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962). See text at notes
82-83, infra. In the most recent Colgate decision, 326 F.2d 517 (1st Cir. 1963), it was held
that the Commission still had not followed the mandate of the court as to the proper
scope of the order.
148 16 C.F.R. 1* 2.21-2.32.
149 Barnes, "False Advertising," 23 Ohio St. L.J 597, 616 (1962).
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involving some thirty brands of cigarettes, the most notable being discontinu-
ance of all "tar and nicotine" claims by the leading manufacturers.'"
These, then, are the procedural weapons Congress has given the Com-
mission. But consider the span of the task of effectively blocking every
avenue of deception opened by any company so inclined throughout the
country with nothing but individual cease and desist orders for enforcement.
It summons the ridiculous picture of men patrolling an immense porous dam
attempting to plug up constantly erupting cracks and holes with cork plugs.
The first and perhaps most obvious problem is the enormity of the area
to be covered. The most constructive approach to adequate coverage would
be an extensive effort to enlist the aid of state Attorneys General in policing
local deceptive activity within their own state. This would initially involve
expenditure of valuable man-hours in assisting state personnel in establishing
an effective local system of surveillance and prosecution of violations—a
system that would allow smooth and efficient cooperation with the Federal
Commission through the regional offices. The experience of the Commission
would also be invaluable in assisting in the drafting of state legislation
which would give the state Attorney General the procedural equipment
necessary to do an effective job on his own. The impact of advertising media
in influencing the buying habits of the public has become so apparent that
state Attorneys General are in most cases deeply aware of the need of pro-
tection for their state citizens which the Commission is simply not equipped
to give."' However, between this realization of the need and the willingness
to expend the money, time and personnel necessary, there is a gap that might
be bridged only at the expense of a substantial enlistment and training effort
on the part of the Commission. Special assistance in informing state legis-
latures of the wisdom of giving adequate power to the attorney general in
this respect might require more Commission time. But the end result, if
successful, would be a network of manpower far more equal to the task.
The Commission would hopefully be relieved of the burdens of investigating
and prosecuting innumerable state-wide violators and could give its full
concentration to nation-wide deceptive campaigns through the nation-wide
media of television, radio, national magazines, etc.
In addition to manpower, the second major limitation on the Commis-
sion is lack of appropriate procedural powers. When the Commission attacks
a practice widely used throughout an industry, such as deceptive advertising
of sale prices as being "greatly reduced"; "going out of business sale";
or "buy one and get one free" (when the price charged for one is raised
to cover both items), among retail stores, it faces two immediate problems.
First, it is beyond the Commission's resources of time, men, and money to
attack individually every offender throughout the industry. Secondly, those
individuals reached first may have to compete for years with competitors who
can continue with impunity to use deceptive practices until the Commission
finally has time to proceed against them. Notice also that the deceiver gets
150 Cigarette Advertising Guide, Sept. 22, 1955. See text at notes 98-99, infra.
151 Memorandum from James Ma Henderson, General Counsel, to Frank C.
Hale, Program Review Officer, Nov. 6, 1962.
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the "first bite" free of charge. At most he can be ordered to cease and desist
from deceiving again in this particular way.
One possible solution to the problem would be to give to the Commission
substantive rule-making power—the power to enact rules, reviewable by the
courts, which would specifically make practices which have consistently been
proven to be violations punishable whenever and by whomever they are
committed. If, for example, the Commission could enact a rule making
the common types of price deception actionable by criminal and civil pen-
alties, the entire retail industry would be put on notice. Infractions would
be widely eliminated in one step if the penalty for infraction were an effec-
tive fine rather than an order not to do it again. The "wait till they catch
me" attitude would become unprofitable and risky. The effect would of
course be to delegate legislative power from Congress to the Commission,
but consider which of the two is in a better position to effect rules that will
be current and effective in a constantly changing field. Constitutional safe-
guards would be provided by judicial review. At present, Section 6(g) of
the Act empowers the Commission to "make rules and regulations for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of this act." But the Commission is
not empowered to provide penalties for violations of these rules. The Trade
Practice Conference Rules mentioned above merely give warning of the type
of infractions for which the Commission will impose cease and desist orders.
Substantive rule-making power would also eliminate the "free first bite."
Presently those who employ deceptive practices have virtually nothing to
lose and a lucrative advantage over the public and competitors to gain. If,
however, that advantage could cost them a sizeable fine, the percentage might
lie in the side of not attempting the deception in the first place. Effective
and publicized prosecution of a relatively small number could have a wide-
spread effect in keeping advertisers honest. This theory has worked well
to the advantage of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
As a minimum, however, the power of the Commission should at least
be bolstered to the extent of allowing the issuance of cease and desist orders
on the basis of violations of Commission rules. Presently, the violation charged
must in each case be proven to have the capacity to deceive. If the Com-
mission could issue rules to the effect that certain practices do have the
capacity to deceive and then issue cease and desist orders for violation of
those rules, considerable duplicative litigation could be avoided. Another
desperately needed procedural weapon is the power to issue interlocutory
cease and desist orders in prima facie cases to take effect immediately and to
be appealable immediately. In this way the Commission could put an effec-
tive stop to the violation without awaiting interminable appeals during which
the violation continues free of charge.
PROBLEMS IN OVERLAPPING ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION
No analysis of federal regulation of advertising would be complete with-
out some discussion of the vesting of jurisdiction over this regulation in
agencies whose responsibility is supplementary to that of the FTC. As of
1956, controls in this area were exercised by twenty-one separate admin-
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istrative bodies, 152 with differing scopes of authority ranging from the broad
authority of the Federal Trade Commission to the narrow power of the
Interior Department to regulate advertising pertaining to Indian arts and
crafts. 153
 In addition to the conflicting areas of authority, the various
agencies employ different statutory standards in testing the legal validity
of advertisements. For instance, the Wheeler-Lea Amendments define false
advertising as that which is "misleading in a material respect," while the
stricter Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines mislabelling as that which
is "misleading in any particular." Further, the agencies use different admin-
istrative sanctions—contrast the cease and desist order of the FTC with
the authority of the Federal Communications Commission to revoke broad-
casting licenses. Four of the more important of the several agencies which
exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the FTC will be considered in some detail:
the Department of the Post Office; the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
of the Internal Revenue Service in the Department of the Treasury; the
Federal Communications Commission; and the Food and Drug Administra-
tion in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.'"
The regulatory authority of the Postmaster General stems from the
power of Congress to establish post offices and post roads. 155 It has long
been settled that the Postmaster may deny the use of the mails to certain
materials and to stipulate the terms on which the material may be excluded
or omitted.1 5" Thus, any use of the mails to advertise, deliver or receive
orders or remittances subjects the user to an indirect regulation of his
materials.
The Postmaster General has three types of sanctions at his command:
the revocation of second class mailing privileges, the fraud order and the
criminal penalty. Each of these, however, has certain limitations which
impair its effectiveness. The Postmaster may refuse to grant second class
mailing privileges to an advertiser, who may not be able to operate without
the advantage of these lower rates. The courts, however, have strictly limited
152 Note, "The Regulation of Advertising," 56 Coturn. L. Rev. 1018, 1020 (1956).
isa 49 Stat. 891 (1935), 25 U.S.C. § 305a (1958).
154 Other government agencies whose operation embraces some kind of advertising
control either by specific language or by statutory implication include:
Advertising for the sale of securities through the mail or any instrument of inter-
state commerce:
the SEC 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-78(jj) (1958); 48 Stat. 74
(1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-77(aa) (1958)
Authority to suppress advertising abuses in the areas under their jurisdiction:
the CAB, 52 Stat. 1003 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 491 (1958)
the ICC, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1958)
the FPC, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 791(a) (1958).
Common carriers and airlines covered by the above are specifically excluded
from FTC jurisdiction, thus decreasing the possibility of inter-agency conflicts.
There are also qualified exceptions to FTC jurisdiction for parties subject to
the regulations promulgated under certain statutes such as the Packers and
Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 169 (1921), 7 U.S.C. § 227 (1958).
For an exhaustive compilation, see 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1018, supra note 152, at 1097
(Appendix).
155 U.S. Const. art. I § 8.
155 Ex parte Jackson, 96 US. 727 (1877). 	 •
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this power, reasonably fearing that its abuse would restrain freedom of ex-
pression?" Secondly, the Postmaster is empowered to issue a fraud order,'"
in effect returning to the sender with the stamp of "fraudulent" all mail
addressed to a party found to be conducting a scheme to obtain money
through the mails under false pretenses. Thirdly, the Postmaster may prose-
cute such an offender criminally. 159 The last two remedies similarly require
the showing of an intent to defraud as well as the use of the mails in further-
ance of this intent.'" The courts have been strict in requiring a showing
of actual fraud; thus, if the Postmaster is unable to prove this, he should
leave the remedy to other agencies?'"
The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service
is authorized to regulate liquor advertising under the Federal Alcoholic Ad-
ministration Act?" Although it is unclear whether this statute divests the
FTC of jurisdiction over liquor advertisements, in practice the Commission
rarely acts in that area.'" The advertisers of alcohol have cooperated with
the regulatory authority, partly because of their fear of a reinstigation of
the Prohibition movement and partly because of the Division's extensive
powers.'" The Division may act against deceptive and misleading repre-
sentations and may promulgate regulations setting its own standards of
legal validity. Its sanctions include its licensing power over the privilege of
engaging in all aspects of the liquor business and its corresponding authority
to fine and/or revoke or suspend the licenses, although, as a matter of
policy, the revocation is used only as a last resort?"
The Federal Communications Commission is charged with responsibility
for encouraging proper standards of radio and television transmission?"
The broadcast station licensee has the direct responsibility of selection and
presentation of program material, including advertising, subject to its statu-
tory obligation to operate in the public interest. The regulatory scheme is
predicated upon the FCC's broad licensing power; control of advertising is
effected indirectly, through the sanction of license revocation against the
broadcaster, who will probably discontinue the offensive advertisement
rather than lose his license. The FCC also employs pressures less formal
157 Hannegan, Postmaster General v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946). For
further discussion of the constitutional problems involved see Deutsch, "Freedom of
the Press and of the Mails," 36 Mich. L. Rev. 703 (1938). For a related issue see
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), where the Court struck down a
state tax on newspaper advertising as an infringement upon freedom of the press.
158 26 Stat. 466 (1890), 39 U.S.C. § 259 (1958).
1" 62 Stat. 763 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958).
100
	
Corp. v. (Meson, 124 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Calif. 1954). Note that in
FTC proceedings it is not necessary to show intent; the misrepresentation alone is a
sufficient predicate of liability.
101 Pinkus v. Walker, 61 F. Supp. 610 (D.N.J. 1945), modified, 338 U.S. 269
(1949).
102 49 Stat. 977 (1935), 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-212 (1958).
103 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1018, supra note 152, at 1037.
104 Id. at 1049.
105 Id. at 1050.
loo 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. II 151-609 (1958).
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than revocation, such as the threat of initiating hearings on a license renewal
application.'"
Given the various degrees of guilt in false advertising and given the
indirect operation of the harsh penalty of revocation against the offending
advertiser, it would seem that the Federal Trade Commission has a better
arsenal of administrative sanctions with which to regulate false adver-
tising. Nonetheless, the Federal Communications Commission has entered
the field by reason of its concern with both the qualitative merits of the
advertising copy and the proportionate amount of time allotted to substantive
programming as compared to advertising. In recognition of this concern,
the two agencies have recently reached a working agreement,'" wherein it
was agreed that the FCC would advise the station of any complaint received
by the FCC regarding deceptive advertising, since, if an authority such as
the FTC found that the copy was deceptive, its continued broadcast would
raise doubts that the station was meeting its obligation to broadcast in the
public interest. To facilitate this practice, the FTC agreed in turn to advise
the FCC of any questionable advertising broadcasts and, if the copy were
in fact the basis for the issuance of a complaint or a cease and desist order
by the FTC, that agency agreed to supply all relevant papers and informa-
tion to the FCC.
In 1938, the same year in which it enacted the Wheeler-Lea Amend-
ments to the Federal Trade Commission Act, Congress passed the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Ace" The most glaring example of concurrent
agency jurisdiction is illustrated by the interaction between the Federal Trade
Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, the agency given control
over misbranding and mislabelling of food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics.
The Wheeler-Lea Amendments gave the FTC authority over the false adver-
tisement of these same products, and the misbranding sections of the Food
and Drug Act cover labelling (material accompanying the article)'" as well
as labels (material on the immediate container). The relevant legislative
history manifests a Congressional intent not to give the FDA exclusive
jurisdiction in the area of false advertising generally,m but to limit it to
misbranding. Early cases, however, further confused the situation by holding
167 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1018, supra note 152, at 1046.
168 22 Fed. Reg. 2318 (1957) ; 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. If 9851.
160 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. ** 301-392 (1958).
no U.S. v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355 (1948) ; Kordel v. U.S., 335 U.S. 345 (1948),
171 Note, "Developments in the Law: The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 632, 650 (1954).
This seems wise, since the basic tool of the FDA is seizure of the adulterated or
misbranded products. It is thus, unlike the FTC cease and desist order, limited by the
number of offensive articles. Such a weapon has obvious inadequacies when applied to
advertising in a national market.
For a history of the legislative controversy on this topic before the bills were
passed see Cavers, "The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History
and its Substantive Provisions," 6 Law and Contemp. Prob. 3-22 (1939). It has also
been suggested that the retention of FTC authority was a concession to the business
and advertising interests who were opposed to a stricter enforcement of advertising con-
trols and who thus favored the then weak FTC. See 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1018, supra
note 152, at 1054.
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that despite the exclusion of the word "labelling" from FTC jurisdiction
over food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics under the Wheeler-Lea Amendments,
the FTC could act in this area through its grant of power over unfair prac-
tices in section 5."2
One of the more important and controversial problems arising from
the fact of concurrent jurisdiction is that of res judicata. Tliis area is still
quite unsettled, and the commentators are divided as to the holdings of
the cases.'" The only clear rule seems to be that a decision favorable to
the respondent advertiser cannot be disturbed in a subsequent proceeding by
another agency based on the same charge of misrepresenting the character
of the goods.'" A recent easel." has indicated that the FDA will not be
precluded by an earlier FTC order unless the same issues (strictly con-
strued) are litigated. Despite the statement in that decision, however, that
the FTC and FDA remedies are cumulative rather than exclusive, until such
policy is further clarified to meet the various forms and stages of finality
of the procedural sanctions employed by both agencies, it would seem that
the ultimate determination of a controversy may depend on the agency which
is the first to act.
To meet these and other problems, the two agencies in 1954 entered
into an agreementl" acknowledging the primary responsibility of the FTC for
advertising and of the FDA for mislabelling, but recognizing their common
goal—the prevention of deception of the public. The agreement provided
for the creation of a liaison system between the agencies to exchange in-
formation before the regulatory machinery begins to act. The two agencies
also restricted their simultaneous initiation of proceedings involving the
same parties to those unique situations where the public interest demanded
such action. Although the agreement is merely an expression of policy and
does not, therefore, preclude the exercise of full jurisdiction by either
agency, the very fact of its existence manifests a cognizance of the problem
that is necessary for the eventual elimination of duplication of administra-
tive effort of inter-agency rivalry.
The embryonic beginnings at inter-agency coordination, as exemplified
by the aforementioned "working agreements" and the FTC's tacit with-
drawal from the area controlled by the Alcoholic Tax Division are not to be
overlooked as steps in the direction of the needed eventual reallocation of
responsibility in the tangled thicket of advertising regulation. Given, how-
ever, the different statutory standards employed by each agency, as well
as their invocation of regulatory sanctions of varying degrees of severity
(often with little relationship to the gravity of the offense), the utility of
these private cooperation agreements would seem to be limited. The advertis-
172 Houbigant, Inc. v. FTC, 138 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1944); Fresh Grown Preserve
Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1942).
178 Compare 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1018, supra note 152, at 1036, with Kleinfield and
Goding, "Res Judicata and Two Coordinate Federal Agencies," 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 388
(1947), and cases cited therein.
174 United States v. 1 Dozen Bottles, etc., 146 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1944).
175 United States v. 5 Cases . . . of Capon Springs Water, 156 F.2d 493 (2d Cir.
1946).
176 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 9850.
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ing media should be entitled to rely on some degree of certainty and con-
sistency in the law. Thus, some legislative recodification of agency functions
and sanctions seems necessary. There are two paths such recodification
could follow: a stricter delineation of agency jurisdiction or a greater con-
centration of regulatory powers in the Federal Trade Commission.'" Since
the former altgrnative could very possibly result in such rigid definitions that
it may leave matters beyond the control of any agency, and since most
of the other agencies are more importantly concerned in other areas of
regulation, it would seem that the proper solution would lie in the direction
of greater centralization and concentration of jurisdiction in the agency of
primary responsibility, the Federal Trade Commission.'"
CONCLUSION
An analysis of federal regulation of advertising reflects the traditional
balancing of interests in American constitutional history between the private
legal order and the public law, between the freedom to contract (in the broad-
est sense of economic competition) and the use of the police power of the
state to preserve the conditions under which such competition may flourish
without injury to the public. In the field of advertising, the purpose of this
regulation is to secure the free flow of truthful information to the market-
place. Even conceding the statutory expansion of Federal Trade Commission
jurisdiction since 1914, that agency still lacks the procedural weapons to
effectuate this purpose. Further expansion is necessary in the following
directions: a grant of substantive rule-making power to the FTC with
effective penalties for violations; and of power to issue interlocutory cease
and desist orders. Legislative reorganization toward a greater concentration
of power in the hands of the FTC by a removal of jurisdiction over adver-
tising from several of the other agencies presently involved in the field is
also imperative. In addition, administrative practice has lagged in ac-
complishing what the present law does prescribe. Greater effectiveness could
be achieved by widespread enlistment and utilization of the resources of
state Attorneys General in patrolling deceptive practices on the state and
local level and by more extensive employment of the official notice doctrine.
JUDITH L. OLANS
JOHN F. DOBBYN
171 This latter alternative has been recently suggested by Dean Landis but on a
much less comprehensive level. Landis, Report on the Regulatory Agencies to the
President Elect, Subcommittee on Administrative Procedure and Practice of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. 48-52 (Comm. Print
1960).
178 This suggestion is viable only if the F,T.C. were given the power to make
substantive rules and the authority to issue interlocutory cease and desist orders as
advocated in the section entitled "Formal Procedures in Dealing with Deceptive
Practices," supra at 725-33.
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